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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
THE PENNSYLVANIA FRAUDULENT CONVERSION ACT OF 1917
The Fraudulent Conversion Act of 19171 reads as follows: I. Any person
having received or having possession, in any capacity or by any means or man-
ner whatever, of any money or property, of any kind whatsoever, of or belong-
ing to any other person, firm, or corporation, or which any other person,
firm, or corporation is entitled to receive and have, who fraudulently with-
holds, converts, or applies the; same, or any part thereof, or the proceeds
or any part of the proceeds, derived from the sale or other disposition there-
of, to and for his own use and benefit, or to and for the use and benefit
of any other person, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon; conviction
thereof shall be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars,
and to undergo an imprisonment not exceeding five years, or either or both,
.n the discretion of the court.
II. The offense specified in this act may be joined in the same bill of in-
dictment with any other felony or misdemeanor arising out of the same trans-
action or transactions, and there may be included in the same indictment as
many counts as there are separate and distinct misdemeanors hereunder com-
mitted against the same person, firm, or corporation.
III. It is the true intent and meaning of this act to define and punish
a distinct and separate midemeanor, and this act shall, in no wise, repeal or
alter any statute relating to any felony or misdemeanor heretofore defined and
punished by the laws of this Commonwealth.
CHARACTER AND PURPOSE
The act is, by its language, a general statute, i.e. one "relating to the
whole community, or concerning all persons generally, as distinguished from
a private or special statute which operates only upon particular persons and
private concerns".2 The act specifically says that any person acting in any
capacity who fraudulently converts any property or money of any person, firm
or corporation shall be guilty. Prior statutess provide for the punishment of
particular classes of persons (bankers, brokers, attorneys, merchants, agents,
servants, employees, bailees, consignees, factors, partners, officers, managers
of corporations, tax-collectors, etc.) and in order to secure a conviction under
them the accused must belong to the particular class designated in the statute.
4
'Act of 1917, P.L. 241; 18 P.S. section 2486.
21 Black. Comm., pp. 85 & 86.
8Act of Mar. 31, 1860, P.L. 382; Act of May 9, 1889, P.L. 145; Act of June 12,
1878, P.L. 196; Act of May 13, 1876, P.L. 161; Act of May 1, 1861, P.L. 503; Act
of Apr. 23, 1909, P.L. 169; Act of June 3, 1885, P.L. 72, etc.
4 Coza. v. Fahnestock, 15 CX. 598.
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This act of 1917, however, does not confine itself to certain classes of per-
sons, but is applicable to any person who is capable of committing criminal acts.6
The purpose of the act was probably two-fold. Its first purpose could be
said to be an attempt to cover any and all cases not covered by previous sta-
tutes on embezzlement. 6 As has been noted, these statutes legislated against
particular classes of persons. Prosecutions under these special statutes some-
times fail because it developed that the accused did not belong to any one of
the classes specified in the acts. For example, a defendant who appeared to be
an agent and was prosecuted for embezzlement as such, was found by the
court not to be an agent within the court's interpretation of that word, and
hence was not convicted.' Having been prosecuted under an act which made
it a crime for an agent tc embezzle, it was necessary to prove the agency to
obtain a conviction. Further than that, it was not only necessary to prove
that the accused was a member of the particular class specified in the statute
under which he was indicted but it had to be proved that at the time ot
the receipt of the property the accused was acting in that particular capacity.8
So in the above example, if it had been found that the defendant was an
agent, but had not received the property embezzled in that capacity, he could
not have been convicted. As it is usually stated, the defendant must receive the
property embezzled "by virtue of his employment," and unless it is so proved
there cannot be a conviction. Experience has shown that many times it is
difficult to fit the accused into any one of the classes specified, and, although
the moral guilt and the social wrong may be just as great where he does not fall
within the classes as where he does, the chances of punishing him are slight.
Additional legislation was obviously necessary to cover up such deficiencies.
The second purpose is closely related to the first in that it arose out of
the necessity of alleging and proving that the accused belongs to a special
class. As before stated, this necessity often made it difficult to prove that
the defendant belonged to any of the classes covered by the special statutes.
But it also gave rise to an additional difficulty. In indicting under one of these
special statutes, it must be proved that the defendant is a member of that partic-
ular class specified in the statute under which he is indicted.9 This is a matter
of indicting under the correct statute, and the prosecutor must be prepared to
prove that he has. On the face of things it would appear to be a simple matter
to select the proper statute, but this is not always the case. The distinction
Letween the various classes is sometimes so vague that it is difficult to determine
6Corn. v. Drass, 111 Pa. Super. 375.
6Com. v. Gartman, 83 Pa. Super. 108.
7 Com. v. Kaufman, 11 Lanc. 247; Com. v. Lynch, 3 Lanc. 412; Com. v. Zehner,
13 Sch. 140; Com. v. Boyer 3 C.C. 234.
SCorn. v. Ambler, 30 Dist. 437; Com. v. 'Wheeler, 73 Pa. Super. 164.
9 Com. v. Beeby, 3 Lanc. 358; Com- v. Winkle, 43 Dist. 404.
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whether the accused was acting in the capacity of an agent, servant, bailee or
another of the classes. 10 So if the counsel for the defense is successful in
convincing the court that his client was not acting in the capacity or was
not a member of the particular class which the indictment alleges, the guilty
party may escape punishment altogether or at best the proceedings will be
delayed. Thus where a defendant was indicted for converting goods as a
bailee, it was held that he was an agent and should have been indicted as
such." The second purpose, then, may be said to be to prevent the pleading
of those fine distinctions between the classes which are often raised in connec-
tion with these special statutes on embezzlement.'
2
PERPETRATOR
The act says any person acting in any capacity may be found guilty of the
offense. However, this language is subject to qualification. The word "person"
as sometimes interpreted, means any "legal person", which would include cor-
porations. It is doubtful if such is the case. The word is probably to be interpreted
to mean any natural person. While corporations can be held criminally liable, it
is usually for conduct involving nonfeasance or misfeasance.13 Although the
tendency in some jurisdictions has been to extend this liability to crimes of
malfeasance where the particular crime was instigated by corporate officers
and in the interests of the corporation, 14 Pennsylvania takes the attitude that
such conduct as is involved in fraudulent conversion or other crimes of mal-
feasance cannot be ascribed to a corporation when the conduct is that of the
corporate officers.- This attitude is evidenced in the special statutes on em-
bezzlement which legislate against corporate officers but not against corpora-
tions. Fraudulent conversion is a crime requiring intent, and intent, it has been
held, cannot be imputed to an inanimate legal entity, but only to natural
persons.
The natural persons, who can commit the crime, would, in turn, of
course, be limited to those'to whom a criminal intent can be ascribed. The
general rules applicable to infancy, insanity, and drunkenness with respect to
criminal liability would also apply to the crime of fraudulent conversion.
Notwithstanding the broad language used in the act of 1917, i.e. that
any person acting in any capacity may be found guilty, the question arose
as to whether the statute applied to those persons already covered by previous
10 Com. v. Zehner, 13 Sch. 140.
IlCom. v. Burkholder, 21 Lanc. 118.
12Com. v. Drass, 11.1 Pa. Super. 375.
' Com. v. Bredin, 165 Pa. 224; Com. v. New Bethlehem Borough, 15 Pa. Super 158.
24See Miller on Criminal Law, page 147.
15See Savidge a Peca'a. Corporations, Vol. I, page 714.
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acts, or whether it was intended to be exclusive of them. The cases decided soon
after the passage of the act were inclined to exclude from its operation those
classes of persons punishable under one of the special acts. In Com. v. Dixon,'8
an agent was indicted under the Act of 1917 for fraudulent conversion of
his principal's funds and the court said that there could not be a conviction
under this act, because embezzlement by an agent was punishable under the
act of 1860. In Com. v. Gartman'7 the court said that if the facts disclose
embezzlement by a partner of partnership funds the indictment must be under
the Act of June 3rd, 1885, P. L. 60. These courts supported their reasoning
by pointing to section 3 of the act, which says, in effect, that the act is in-
tended to define a separate misdemeanor and not to repeal or alter any other
existing statute of the state. However, this reasoning is false, for to hold
that this act applies to the classes of persons specified in the prior acts neither
repeals nor alters those acts. Indictments will still lie under them if the
case falls exactly within them. This is the attitude which the courts have taken
in the later cases. The case of Com. v. Wooden' 8 led the decisions in the
other direction. Here, an officer of a corporation was prosecuted under the
Fraudulent Conversion Act for converting corporate funds to his own use. The
indictments were ordered quashed on the grounds that he should have been
indicted under the 116th section of the Act of 1860, P. L. 382. The upper
court, in reversing the order said, "The act of conversion is the gravamen of
the offense of fraudulent conversion rather than how, when, or in what capacity
the defendant received and possessed the property prior to the crime." The
court, however, somewhat clouded the issue by attempting to distinguish the
fraudulent conversion by a corporate officer under the Act of 1860 from the
conduct of the defendant in the case in question. The case of Com. v. Drass'9
is decisive on this point. An agent was indicted under the Act of 1917 for
converting his principal's funds. A motion to quash the indictment or the
ground that it was not brought under the proper statute was refused. On
appeal the upper court sustained the trial court in language that no longer
left the question in doubt. It said, through Trexler, P. J., "We need not
inquire as to whether he got the money as agent, broker, banker, or in any
other way; the fact that he received the money of others and fraudulently
converted and applied it to his own use brings him under the act. . .It was to
avoid the drawing of fine distinctions which, no doubt, induced the passing
of the latter act, so that fraudulent conversion could be punished irrespective
of the capacity in which the defendant received the property. Section 3 of the
1G49 C.C. 527.
173 D. & C. 329.
1894 Pa. Super. 452; see also Com. v. Akromovage, 25 Luz. 309.
19111 Pa. Super. 375.
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Act of 1917, was never intended to exclude from its application the partic-
ular classes of individuals covered by the several sections of the Act of 1860.
It was to provide a definite and separate misdemeanor applying to any one
who fraudulently converted the property of another, but it also left the pro-
visions of the Criminal Code20 still operative."
Considered with respect to the purposes of the act, this conclusion is
logical and reasonable. In the past fraudulent conversion has been particularly
difficult to prosecute by reason of just such technicalities. The legislature pass-
ed this general statute to ease the situation. To allow, then, those same tech-
nicalities which before enabled guilty parties to escape or delay justice would be
to defeat the purposes of the act. If the prosecutor can show a fraudulent con-
version of another's property, (an offense which this act plainly makes a
crime), the guilty party certainly should not be protected merely because an-
other statute also covers the same situation. As one court has said, "Criminal
pleading is no longer the technical thing it once was, and courts look more to
substantial justice than to artificial nicety."
21
PROPERTY
There has been only one case under the Act of 1917 which raised the
question of the kind of property to which the act applied.22 Counsel in this
case questioned the constitutionality of the act for the reason that the title
of the act does not give notice that "original money" was subject to conver-
sion. The court held, however, that the title, in using the language "property
u thLC prUced. Uo jiuoclLty, was broau Cnough to U UC UdIe "o.i . tLI MUL1Cy
Practical examples of other types of property subject to conversion under this
statute are horses, cattle, automobiles, stock certificates, promissory notes,
bonds, etc.23 Logically, it would seem that any property capable of ownership
and which is of any value at all to the owner can be the subject of conver-
sion, as the offense is the depriving another of property which he owns or is
entitled to have. We can safely assume that the courts will not consider the
value of the property in the sense that it must be above a certain value. It
would be absurd to say that any property under a fixed value could not be
fraudulently converted. On the other hand, the property must not be valueless,
as it would be equally absurd to make it a criminal act to convert something
of no value to anyone. 24 In this respect, each case must stand on its own merits,
2OThe Criminal Code is the Act of Mar. 31, 1860, P.L. 382.
21Com. v. Wooden, 94 Pa. Super. 205.
22 Com. v. Disanto, 33 Dauph. 144.
2
3SCom. v. Spear, 73 Pa. Super. 205; Com. v. Lindeman, 15 D. & C. 454; Com.
v. Overheim, 106 Pa. Super. 424; Com. v. Shanklin, 87 Pa. Super 434; Corn v.
Ryder, 80 Pa. Super. 452; Com. v. Gilliam, 82 Pa. Super. 75.
94See 20 C.J. page 414.
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and it is for the court to determine whether the particular property in question
falls within the term as used in the statute.
OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY
Each case must be examined carefully to ascertain where the title to the
property purportedly converted lies, as it is essential that the property belong
to one other than the accused.25 The act was not intended to apply where
the defendant converts his own property.26 Sometimes it requires a close ex-
amination of the facts to discover if the ownership is in the accused or
another. Such was the case where A was injured and received medical atten-
tion from B, a physician. A's insurance company gave him a draft drawn to the
order of A and B. A procured B's indorsement to the draft by giv-
ing him a check for the amount B was entitled to have. A then stopped pay-
ment on the check before B could cash it, and B was never paid for his ser-
vices. A was prosecuted under the Act of 1917. It was argued by the defense
that title to the draft was in A and he, therefore, was not converting another's
property. This argument was not sustained. The draft had been drawn to the
order of A and B, thereby placing title partly in B, and A's conversion of the
entire proceeds was fraudulent. The court held thus in the face of the fact
that B had indorsed the draft with the apparent intention of giving up title
to his share.27
Sometimes what appears to be the conversion of another's property by the
accused is nothing more than a breach of contract or a failure to pay a debt.
Neither of these situations constitutes a crime, and the Act of 1917 is not
applicable to them. 28 Thus where an investment company lent money to an
automobile agency with which to buy a car, which car was sold by the. agency,
but the borrowed money never repaid, there was no fraudulent conversion.29
The investment c6mpany prosecuted on the theory that, in as much as it had
lent the money with which to buy the car, the car was its property. This
reasoning, of course, was false. The company, in lending the money, had given
up title to it. The money was, thereafter, the property of the agency, and in
converting it and later the car, it was dealing with its own property. In the
words of the court, "It (the statute) is not to be so applied as to make it an
effective substitute for an action at law in the collection of a debt".
Z5Com. v. Bixer, 79 Pa. Super. 295.
26.om. v. Hillpot, 84 Pa. Super. 454.
27Com. v. Cox, 19 D. & C. 12. While this point was not discussed by the court.
A's method of procuring B's indorsement was an obvious fraud, which made voidable
any title which he may have acquired thereby. Then too, it is probable that this pattic-
ua type of situation would fall within the Act of 1917; See ante.
M|Com. v. Brown, 49 C.C. 647; Com. v. Heit, 8 D. & C. 797.
29Com. v. Bizler, 79 Pa. Super. 29).
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In a similar case,3 0 B desired to purchase a new car. He turned over
his old one with the certificate of title to A as part of the purchas price.; A
sold the old car, but did not give B a new car as agreed. B prosecuted un-
der the Act of 1917 charging a fraudulent conversion of the old car. This
could not be proved, as the title to the old car was no longer in B. He had given
up title to A as part of the purchase price. A had sold his own property, an act
for which he could not be criminally liable. It is true that he failed to carry
out the agreement, but, as before noted, the Act of 1917 was not intended to
punish a breach of contract.
On the other hand, what sometimes appears to be a breach of contract or
a failure to pay a debt may be a fraudulent conversion. This is the case
where property is sold on the bailment lease plan. 3' For example, A desires
to buy an automobile. He is given a lease on a car which stipulates that he is
to pay a periodic rental for its use, and after paying the full price in rentals,
for a nominal consideration, title to the car is to be transferred to him. The
seller, by this method, preserves the title of the car in his own name until
it has been fully paid for. So, if A were to sell the car and convert the
proceeds to his own use and refuse to pay the balance of the purchase price,
he would be converting another's property. What, at first glance, seems
to be a failure to pay a debt or a breach of contract is a fraudulent conver-
sion, and may be punished under the Act of 1917.
The above cases merely serve to illustrate the importance of examining
-the facts carefully to ascertain where the title to the property lies. In this
connection it is well to note that the ownership need not be necessarily in the
one who piosecutes. The act says "property belonging to any other person,
firm, or corporation or which any other, person, firm, or corporation is entitled
to receive or have". Thus if a bailee, who is entrusteed with property, in
turn entrusts it to a third party, who then fraudulently cohverts it, the third
party cannot be heard to say that the property did not belong to the bailee, and
that the situation, therefore, does not fall within the act.32 Although the prop-
erty may not belong to the bailee, the latter is entitled to "receive and have
it", and an indictment under the act will be sustained. The owner of the prop-
erty, however, must be identified in the indictment to show that the title lies
in one other than the accused.8 3
8 OCom. v. Overheim, 106 Pa. Super. 424; but see Com. v. Day, 20 D. & C. 136 in
which the same method was used to procure title to a car, and the defendant was con-
victed. The court i0 this case, however, believed that the defendant from the beginning
intended to defraud the owner of the car and, after much consideration, managed
to convict him of fraudulent conversion on a technicality.
SICom. v. Petres, 2 Som. 296.
Z2Com. v. Davis, 26 Dauph. 160
S8 Com. v,. Sbhnidin 87 PM Supa. 53.
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There is one other phase of ownership to be considered in construing
this statute. The act punishes the conversion of the property of any. other
person, firm, or corporation. One case has held that if the owner does not fall
within one of these categories, a prosecution under the act will fail." 4 In this
case the defendant fraudulently converted money belonging to a school dis-
trict. The court said that he could not be convicted under the Act of 1917.
It gave as its reason the fact that the Supreme Court in at least two early
decisions had held a school district not to be a corporation, which decisions were
presumably known by the legislature, and, therefore, in using the word "cor-
poration", it did not intend to include organizations not strictly falling within
that category. It is difficult to believe, however, in view of the broad language
used elsewhere in the statute, that the legislature intended to exempt from its
operation one who fraudulently converts property of an organization which is
not, strictly speaking, a corporation. As one court has said, 5 "the act of con-
version is the gravamen of the offense . . .", and added, "The courts look
more to substantial justice than to artificial nicety". It is true that the statute
being criminal, must be strictly construed, but in so construing it, the probable
intention of the legislature must be considered, as well as the wording of the
act itself.16 It is the writer's opinion that the act is couched in such language as
to make it plain to the person of ordinary intelligence that the converting of
another's property is being made a crime irrespective of the legal status of the
owner, and that it was never intended by the legislature that such techni-
cal defenses as the one above should be used by one who otherwise is guilty
of fraudulent conversion.
POSSESSION
The crime of embezzlement was created by an early English statute to
cover certain situations which escaped being the common law crime of larceny.
At common law, for larceny to be committed, there had to be a trespass in the
taking; i.e. the accused had to acquire possession of the property by unlawful
means. Therefore, if one, who was entrusted with property by the owner,
or received the property from another to give to the owner, subsequently con-
verted it, he could not be convicted of common law larceny.SS The embezzlement
statutes of England and our states were enacted to remedy this situation. But
many of these statutes, upon being applied, while solving the problem gen-
erally, still left room for defenses based upon vague distinctions, which
3
4Com. v. Smith, 116 Pa. Super. 146.
3SCom. v. Wooden, 94 Pa. Super. 452.
S6See Miller on Criminal Law, page 37.
8739 Geo. II1, c. 85; see also Miller on Criminal Law. page -373.
6Miller on Criminal Law, page 375,.
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served to make a prosecution for embezzlement a complicated matter. These dis-
tinctions arose largely out of the question of possession. For example, it is
said that there must be a "breach of trust" to commit the crime; that if the
defendant has mere custody as distinguished from possession, he can not be
guilty of this particular offense; that unless he receives possession "by virtue
of his employment" the particular statute will not apply.
39
The statute of 1917, however, reads, "Any person having received or
having possession, in any capacity or by any means or manner whatever . . . ".
Such language seems broad enough to cover possession acquired either lawfully
or unlawfully. There are no Pennsylvania cases which discuss the question, and all
the cases which apply the statute, with two exceptions, 40 were situations where
possession was lawfully acquired. In both of these cases, the facts indicated pos-
session acquired by fraud, although this fact was not brought out by the courts. In
the first, the defendant procured the prosecutor's indorsement to a money draft
drawn to the order of both of them, by giving him a check for his share, and
then stopping payment on the check. In the other case, the defendant %induced
the prosecutor to part with title to his car by giving him an order blank
crediting him with payment in full for a new car, which was never delivered.
In both cases the defendants were convicted under the Act of 1917. Whether the
defense overlooked the question of unlawful possession, or whether they took
it for granted that the act applied to such a situation, is not known.
The broad language of the act, together with these cases, would indicate
that in cases of unlawful possession the statute will apply. This is probably
ti-ue, but only to a linited extent. if the property is possessed with the con-
sent of the owner or the one who controls it, even though the consent may
have been induced by fraud, the situation falls within the act. It is likely
that the words "having received or having possession" were intended to ex-
clude cases in which property is taken against the will of the owner or
possessor, as when violence or duress is used, while the words '1by any means or
manner whatever" indicate that it is immaterial that the possession is unlawfully
acquired. This distinction may seem more reasonable when it is pointed out
that where fraud is used to induce consent there is no outward appearance
of unlawful possession, and the perpetrator may convert the property without
fear of interference from the owner, but where violence or duress is used,
there is no pretense at lawfulness, and the owner can take immediate steps
to remedy his wrong.
As has already been noted, the crime may be committed by one acting
in any capacity.A There need not be that relation of trust and confidence
between the accused and the owner, as in the offense of embezzlement.
*9See Wharton's Criminal Law (1932 edition), pages 1587 & 1601.
4OCom. v. Cox, 19 D. & C. 12, and Com. v. Day, 20 D. & C. 136.
41Com. v. Dr'ss, III Pa. Super. 375; Com. v. Mkilc, 115 Pa. Supcc, 269.
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The fact that the defendant did not receive the property "by virtue of his
employment" will not take the case out of the statute. The fraudulent con-
version is the gist of the offense, and not the breaching of a trust.
In spite of the broad language, however, it is not believed that the legis-
lature intended to make the statute applicable in cases of larceny, 'robbery or
other crimes against property. The purpose was rather to lessen the difficulties
which are met with in prosecutions for embezzlement.' 2 It, of course, does
not follow the principles of embezzlement in every respect, but, as it creates a
separate and distinct misdemeanor, 43 this presents no difficulty. In any case,
the distinction between several of the crimes against property is often difficult
to determine before all the evidence is brought out at the trial,"4 and, as it
is permissible under the act to join the offense with any other felony or mis-
demeanor arising from the same transaction, 4" it is always well to do so in case
of doubt.
THE MENTAL ELEMENT-INTENT
As in most crimes, proof of a criminal intent is required to secure a
conviction under the Act of 1917. The act stipulates that anyone who fraudulently
converts the property of another may be guilty; i.e. the conversion must take
place with the intention of defrauding another of the use or benefit of his prop-
erty. So where a court, in charging a jury to convict the defendant if it believed
he had converted the goods in question, omitted the word "fraudulently",
a new trial was granted on the ground that the court's charge failed to give
notice that the defendant must have deliberately and intentionally converted
the goods.4" Although a person may so use another's property as to cause the
other a loss, he cannot be convicted of fraudulent conversion if he neither in-
tended to injure the owner of the property nor to benefit himself or any oth-
er. In Com. v. Domotor47 the defendant, in good faith, used money which
the prosecutor had entrusted to him, to buy a mortgage. The mortgage was
placed in the prosecutor's name, and the interest paid to his wife. The de-
fendant could not be convicted, because he had no intention to defraud the
prosecutor or to benefit himself.
This situation, however, must not be confused with the situation where
the defendant fraudulently uses another's property for his own benefit with
the intention of later making full restitution to the owner. Most fraudulent
42Com. v. Gartman, 83 Pa. Super. 108.
L3Section III of the Act of 1917.
44See Miller on Criminal law, pp. 373 & 374.
45Section II of the Act of 1917; see Com. v. Drass. 111 Pa. Super. 575.
4GCom. v. Lindeman, 15 D. & C. 454.
U$s4 Pa. Super. $52.
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conversions are committed under just these circumstances, and it is no defense to
say that there was an intention to reimburse the owner.' 8 It is the fact that
the defendant uses the property of another, even though temporarily, for his
own or some other's benefit without the owner's consent which makes his con-
duct criminal.' 9 If he converts the property, knowing his act to be wrong,
he is guilty irrespective of his intention as to making right his wrong. Nor is it
a defense to say that the owner later ratified the conversion. Once having,
with criminal intent, used another's property, the offense has been committed,
and ratification will not make it less criminal.
While the intent of the accused must be criminal, the intent of the
'prosecutor or the owner is immaterial. In the case of Com. v. Gartman"0 the
defendant attempted to justify his conduct and criminal intent by pointing to
the prosecutor's illegal purpose. The prosecutor had given the defendant a
large sum of money with which to buy "bootleg" liquor, and the defendant
absconded with the money. This fact, however, did not exempt the defendant
from the operation of the statute. An illegal intention on the part of the
owner of the property does not make the wrongful intention of the accused
less criminal.
H. L. Weary
RIGHT OF PARENT TO SUE CHILD FOR CHILD'S NEGLIGENCE,
TN PET NNSYLVANIA
An action may not be maintained by a parent against an unemancipated
child for personal injuries of the parent resulting from the negligence of the
child. Duffy v. Duffy. 117 Pa. Super. 500, April 15, 1935.
By this case Pennsylvania adopts the conservative view. There are three
other cases in which this question arose.' In only one jurisdiction may the
parent sue the child in this situation. 2 It is interesting to note that in all four
of these cases the plaintiff-parent was the mother.
The reasons advanced by the Pennsylvania court are threefold: (1) in
the converse situation, the great weight of authority will not permit an
48Com.. v. Meile, 115 Pa. Super. 269.
49Com. v. Gilliam, 82 Pa. Super. 75.
5083 Pa. Super. 108.
lCrosby v.. Crosby, 230 App. Div. 651, 246 N. Y. S. 384, (1930); Schneider v.
Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498, (1930); Wells v. Wells, 48 S.W. (2d.) 109, (Mo.,
1932).
SW41s v. WeU 48 S.W. (2d.) 109, (Mo. 1932).
